The Empire from the Inside (Part one)

I am amazed at the widespread ignorance about issues so vital for the
existence of mankind, at a time that it has great media, unimaginable a
hundred years ago, some as recent as the Internet.

Just three weeks ago the news was announced of the imminent distribution
of a spectacular book by Bob Woodward, The Washington Post journalist,
whose articles with Carl Bernstein, 38 years ago, led to the Watergate
scandal which destroyed the Nixon administration for spying against the
Democratic Party in June 1972, for violations of laws that American
society could not ignore.

I contacted our "ambassador in Washington," as I call Jorge Bolanos, the
head of the Cuban Interests Section in the U.S. capital, and asked him to
send me at least two copies of the book as soon as it appeared in the
bookstores. Bolaños sent four copies.

The text is in English, of course, and as usual it will be long before the
over 500 million people who speak or understand Spanish worldwide,
including the Latin American immigrants in the United States, can read it
in that language.

I contacted one of our best English translators, and asked for a special
effort to summarize the contents. The voluminous copy, entitled "Obama's
wars", has 33 chapters and 420 pages.

I should point out that I was given an overview of the 33 chapters, in 99
pages in 18 point type, in just three days.

I will pass on the contents of this book, using the exact words, crystal
clear and precise, that the English translation specialist sent me. It
will take up the Reflections for several days.

It would be impossible to understand anything about the current U.S.
policy if the contents of this book by Woodward are ignored. He is the
holder of more than one Pulitzer Prize and, for sure, has absolutely no
intention of destroying the empire.

Our country will be the first in the world to know the essential contents
of this book in an  articulate form. As it is known, Cuban citizens have
high levels of education, and it is the country with highest percentage of
students enrolled in universities.

Our main strength is not in arms, but in ideas.

CHAPTER 1

“Two days after being elected President, Obama summoned the national
intelligence director, Mike McConnell, for a meeting in Chicago to get
details about the most secret intelligence operations of the extensive
system of espionage in the United States. Other officials participated in
the meeting, but McConnell said he had orders from former President Bush
not to disclose the information related to spies, the new techniques of
infiltrating Al Qaeda, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the protection
of the nation, to anyone other than the elected president.

Michael J. Morell, Head of the CIA analysis department, and McConnell sat
alone with Obama in a secure room. He was informed, among other matters,
that the main threat to the United States came from Pakistan and that this
was the No. 1 priority of the NID. If the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan,
India and Pakistan would fill the power vacuum. The best was that Obama
should seek peace between the two countries. Bush had ordered the drone
attacks on the camps in Pakistan, and he had instructed that this country
should be notified "concurrently"; that is, when the attack occurred or,
for greater security, few minutes later.”

We encourage readers to take note of the names of each of the
personalities mentioned, as well as the theories developed to justify the
incredible events that take place.

“Al Qaeda had recruited people from 35 countries whose passports did not
need a visa to enter the United States, and that was a big concern. Obama
was informed of the key words for the attacks by drones (SYLVAN-MAGNOLIA),
only known by those with the highest level of access to security issues,
among whom was now the new president.

The main successes came from human sources, spies on the ground. The CIA
told  them where to look, where to hunt and where to kill. The spies were
the real secrets that Obama carried with him from now on.  The CIA was
very careful with their sources.

Each one had a code name, for example, MOONRISE. When too many people knew
about him or her, or their successes, they were liquidated. The officer in
charge of the case reported that MOONRISE had made the ultimate sacrifice,
but the person in question had not really died. Only their codename
changed, and now the CIA would have another source called SOOTHING STAR,
the same person with a new name.

One important secret that has never been reported in the media, or
anywhere else, was the existence of a covert army of 3,000 men in
Afghanistan, whose objective was to kill or capture Taliban and sometimes
venture into the tribal areas to pacify them and get support.

McConnell and Morell referred to the Iranian nuclear program. It was known
that they were trying to obtain nuclear weapons and had hidden
installations. McConnell said he was confident that Iran would get a
gun-type nuclear weapon, probably primitive, but that could detonate in
the desert with great effect and that in his opinion this would occur
between 2010 and 2015.

Another major threat was North Korea, which had enough material to make
six bombs. The Koreans would talk, they would lie, would threaten to leave
and then they would try to renegotiate.

The Chinese had hacked the computers of the Obama campaign in the summer
of 2008 and also those of McCain, and had removed files and documents at
an astounding rate. McConnell said the United States were vulnerable to
cyber attacks.”

Straight away, the Woodward book reflects Obama's first reaction to the
mess and complexity of the situation created by the war on terror
unleashed by Bush.
              
“Obama told one of his closest advisers he had inherited a world that
could explode at any time in over six different ways, and had powerful but
limited means to avoid it. Obama acknowledged that after the elections,
all the world's problems were seen as his responsibility and that people
were saying, 'You are the most powerful person in the world. Why don’t you
do something about it?”

CHAPTER 2

“John Podesta, former chief of staff to Bill Clinton, was convinced that
the policy should be designed, organized and monitored through a
centralized system at the White House. But Obama had someone else in mind
for the post: Rahm Emmanuel, who became the No. 3 of the White House. Both
were from Chicago but they did not know each other well.

Obama, as presidential candidate, had told David Petraeus in Iraq to ask
for everything he would need if eventually he became Commander in Chief.
Obama was ready to say 'no' to what Bush had said 'yes'.

Petraeus virtually redefined the concept of war in a new manual he wrote
(Counterinsurgency Field Manual) that came into effect in Iraq. His main
idea was that the U.S. could not get out of the war. They had to protect
and win over the population, live among them, for a stable and competent
government to succeed. The new soldier, he said, should be a social
worker, a physical planner, an anthropologist and a psychologist.

Petraeus had few hobbies (he didn’t fish, hunt, or play golf). He could
pass for a man of 35, and run 5 miles in about 30 minutes. He earned his
Ph.D. at the University of Princeton. His father died and he decided to
stay in Iraq to oversee the war. The Iraqis call him King David. Some of
his colleagues call him the Legend of Iraq. But the Obama presidency would
change the status of Petraeus.”

CHAPTER 3

“The new Director of the CIA, Mike Hayden, traveled to New York to
discuss, with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, the attacks by
unmanned 'Predator' planes within that country. The great lesson of the
Second World War and Viet Nam was that attacks from the air, even massive
bombing cannot win a war.

The Pakistani media was concerned about the number of civilian casualties.
But the accidental death of Pakistanis was only half the story.

In a meeting Hayden had with the Pakistani President, the latter told him:
Kill the principals. You Americans can worry about collateral damage. I’m
not worried.' Zardari gave the CIA the green light and Hayden thanked him
for his support.

In one of his long conversations with David Axelrod, his chief political
adviser and closest to him, Obama brought up the issue of Hillary Clinton.
Axelrod asked Obama how he could trust Hillary. Obama replied that he
believed he knew her well and if she were part of the team, she would be
faithful to him. She stood beside her husband during the Monica Lewinsky
scandal, and Obama was impressed by her resilience. He needed someone with
enough stature to become a major player in the international arena.

Mrs. Clinton was not convinced that this post would be for her. There was
no body of trust between her team and his.

Then came the problems with her husband and the contributors of large sums
of money to his presidential library, his foundation and the Clinton
Global Initiative. Obama's lawyers said these entities could not accept
money if Hillary was appointed Secretary of State. She acknowledged that
this was a big hurdle but she would not send Bill to live in a cave for
four or eight years. She was not going to tell him to cancel the
operations he had in 26 countries and were saving lives, she said, it was
not worth it.  Podesta promised they would work on that.

She prepared a speech in which she thanked Obama, by phone, for having
taken her into account for the position, but Podesta saw to it that both
could not connect.

The 'no' from Hillary was transformed into a 'maybe'. Mark Penn, chief
strategist for her campaign, thought that if they remained at the State
Department for eight years, she would again be in the best position to be
nominated for President. She would only be 69, the same age as Reagan when
he took office.”

CHAPTER  4

“Retired General James L. Jones considered that the Bush administration
was amazingly disorganized and unfortunately not very serious regarding
peace in the Middle East. Jones said the Bush Security Council lacked
personnel and that it was dysfunctional, and that National Security
advisor had to take measures to guarantee reasonable advancement in
pursuing the objectives.

An over large sector of US policy was on autopilot, and the National
Security advisor had to find the way to achieve results without having
detailed control of what different departments and agencies were supposed
to do. Obama asked him how he could achieve that. Jones recommended that
he should convince his subordinates that their vision was the President´s
vision. [...] Obama decided to appoint Jones National Security advisor.
Jones was surprised that Obama had appointed him for a post with such a
high responsibility and that he trusted someone that he hardly knew. Jones
thought everything was based on personal relations, and he did not have
such relations with Obama.

On November 26, Bush called one of the last meetings of the National
Security Council to analyze a very secret report on the war in
Afghanistan, made by Army Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, known as the
Czar of War. The report concluded by stating that the United States could
not stay in Afghanistan unless they solved three major problems: improving
governability, lowering corruption levels and eliminating Taliban
sanctuaries in Afghanistan.”

Another astonishing episode now follows, behind which was the hand of the
US administration, revealing the risk hypothetically referred to by the
author of the “Nuclear Winter”. It would only take—he said—a war between
Pakistan and India, the two countries with the least number of atomic
weapons in the Group of 8 that belong to the “Nuclear Club.” What is
revealed by the book “Obama’s Wars” is the fact that any irresponsible
step in US policy could lead to a catastrophe.

“Condoleezza Rice was not pleased with the report. Bush decided not to
publish it. Later, 10 armed people began prowling the Indian city of
Bombay and creating a picture of chaos and violence, which was aired live
on TV for 60 hours. Six US citizens were killed. The operation was
organized by a group known by the acronyms LeT, which means Army of the
Righteous and was financed by Pakistan’s Intelligence Agency. Bush wanted
to prevent any tensions between India and Pakistan. His mandate was based
on zero tolerance with terrorists and their allies. The FBI was horrified
to see that a low-cost, high-tech operation had paralyzed the city of
Bombay. US cities were as vulnerable. An FBI official said that Bombay had
changed everything.”

CHAPTER 5

“On taking on the post as CIA director, Hayden had inherited and
organization that, according to him, was suffering from the battered child
syndrome.

Obama had called him to a briefing on covert operations. Hayden considered
it to be the opportunity to prove how serious the threats were and how
seriously the CIA took them. He referred to 14 highly secret operations,
whose objective was to carry out covert and lethal operations against
terrorism, prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, discourage North
Korea from building more nuclear weapons, carry out operations against
proliferation in other countries, operate in an independent manner or in
support of the United States in Afghanistan, carry out a series of lethal
operations and other programs in Iraq, support undercover efforts to stop
genocide in the Sudanese region of Darfur, and offer Turkey intelligence
information to prevent the Workers’ Party in the Kurdistan from
establishing a separatist enclave in Turkey.

On January 4, 2009 Hayden learned, from an article on the Washington Post
Website, that he had been replaced as CIA director and that Leon Panetta
had been appointed the new director. Hayden considered that being replaced
by a politician was a personal humiliation. Panetta is skillful in making
personal relations. While meeting with Panetta, Hayden advised him: 1) You
are the commander of the nation in the global war against terrorism; 2)
You have the best personnel of the Federal Government; 3) I have read some
of your articles; do not use the words CIA and torture in the same
paragraph again. Torture is a felony. You might not like this but do not
ever say torture exists. Legally, the CIA has never tortured anyone.
McConnell warned Panetta that he had to understand the battle he had to
wage against the CIA, because they saw him as if he were the enemy.”

CHAPTER 6

“Obama asked Biden to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan before his
inauguration as President, and he asked him to be accompanied by a
Republican. Lindsey Graham, from South Carolina, was the chosen man.

Biden officially told the Pakistani President about Obama’s idea:
Afghanistan would be his war; he would send more troops soon, but he
needed to work jointly with Pakistan.

Zardari, for his part, admitted not having as much experience as his late
wife Benazir Bhutto, but he said his mission was not different and that he
needed the United States to help him win enough support on the domestic
scene, and that there was much anti-American feeling in the country.

Biden warned him that in that direction Zardari had to stop playing in
both teams at the same time, since the CIA thought that much intelligence
information was being used to alert terrorist camps about the attacks by
unmanned planes.

Biden and Graham left for Kabul. Relations between Karzai and the United
States had become very volatile after the 2004 elections. He would
frequently criticize the Americans for the number of civilian victims.
Evidence of corruption within his government and in his family raised
tensions with the United States. Biden warned Karzai that he was not
interested in making life difficult for him, but the success of the United
States to a large extent depended on him.

Karzai called several members of his cabinet to inform Biden and Graham
directly about what he was doing. Karzai was told that Obama wanted to
help, but the idea of lifting the phone and calling President Obama as he
used to do with Bush would not happen anymore. Biden criticized Karzai for
his inability to rule the whole country, for his rejection of touring the
country to raise a consensus among the different tribes, for the sumptuous
homes of Afghan officials near the presidential palace and which
undoubtedly were being paid for by the United States. You are nothing but
the mayor of Kabul, Biden told Karzai.

Karzai was critical about the large number of civilian victims and Biden
committed to minimize them, but he warned that he had to join them in that
war; he said that if it was not their war, the United States would not
send more troops. Karzai replied that he was not making any criticism, but
letting them know about a problem. Biden suggested addressing the issue in
private, not at a press conference, and Karzai did not agree. The number
of civilian victims was a public problem and Biden had denigrated him in
front of his cabinet members. Karzai warned that the Afghan people would
not tolerate that, and the Afghan people should be their allies and not
their victims. Ambassador William Word said that the conversation had been
useful but that it revealed frustrations on both sides.

Biden met with the chief of the American troops in Afghanistan, David
McKiernan, who told him that in order to win the war it was necessary to
send the 30,000 troops still to come since Bush was in power. Biden
inquired about Al Qaeda and David said that he had not seen a single Arab
soldier there in two years. This confirmed Biden’s suspicion that Al
Qaeda, the main objective of the war, was a Pakistani problem.

Biden suggested that Obama distance himself from Karzai. Graham told the
President that they were losing the war. Graham was convinced that it was
impossible to win the war in Afghanistan if they lost the war in Iraq.”

CHAPTER  7

“Obama’s swearing-in ceremony on January 20 was about to be cancelled.
Reliable intelligence reports indicated that a group of Somali extremists
were planning to attack Obama with explosives. However, all the attention
was focused on Obama’s speech and what he would say.

General Petaeus was again concentrating on Afghanistan.

Obama called a meeting of his National Security group on January 21. The
key decision was to appoint Petraeus chief of the Central Command. Obama
requested three options on the war on Iraq. He ordered a 60-day study to
know how they would get to where they wanted to. One of the options to
bear in mind, as requested by the President, was the withdrawal of the
troops in a 16-month period.

A team of 80 people began to study the situation in Afghanistan. They
analyzed the interrogations of prisoners, the battlefield reports,
financial reports, the propaganda and the communiqués issued by the Taliban.

When Petraeus asked what they had found, Derek Harvey, from the Defense
Intelligence Agency, said that the situation was similar to that of a
blind man helping another blind man to walk, that the United States was
very ignorant about the Afghan insurgence, about who and where the enemy
was, and the enemy’s perception of the war and their motivation.

They knew too little about the enemy to draw up a strategy that would lead
to victory. Harvey tried to speed up the gathering of intelligence
information and he dedicated himself completely to it. He held the opinion
that the war could be won, but that the US administration had to make a
significant commitment for many years; which perhaps would not be well
accepted by the voters. Harvey said he believed that the war in
Afghanistan could be waged, but could not be sold.

Obama said that the sending of new troops should be announced as part of a
new strategy. Petraeus indicated that they would not reach their
objectives without a larger number of troops, and that they could not just
rely on the attacks by unmanned planes. Petraeus insisted on the sending
of the 30,000 troops. Obama asked if sending all those troops at once was
necessary, and he warned that it was before having a strategy and that the
President needed him to propose the decisions to take. The President
seemed to understand that the war would not be won in one or two years.
The President left the meeting to fulfill other commitments without having
taken any decision on that respect.”

To be continued tomorrow

Fidel Castro Ruz
October 10, 2010
6:00 p.m.